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The Right to Work and the Right to Strike

Laura Weinrib

Forthcoming, University of Chicago Legal Forum (2017)
The spring 2016 decision in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association,1 in
which an evenly divided Supreme Court declined to invalidate a California public sector
agency shop arrangement on First Amendment grounds, stalled, but did not suspend, an
antilabor campaign on behalf of a constitutionally protected “right to work.”2 Drawing on
recent business-friendly First Amendment decisions, opponents of organized labor
contend that “fair-share” agency fee agreements, which require non-members of a union
to pay their proportionate share of collective bargaining and contract administration
expenses, can no longer weather constitutional scrutiny.3 These advocates argue that the
extent to which employees within a bargaining unit are required to contribute to the costs
incurred on their behalf by a labor organization designated to represent them should be
deferred neither to agreements between unions and employers nor to the legislative
process. Rather, they urge the Court to prohibit any such payment as a matter of
constitutional law.
Whatever their policy preferences, commentators have regarded the new judicial
openness to economically inflected free expression claims of the kind proposed in
Friedrichs as a departure from, or at least a significant extension of, traditional First
Amendment principles. By contrast, this essay demonstrates that advocates articulated
similar arguments as early as the 1930s, when the modern First Amendment took shape.
Moreover, although they did not yet prevail in court, such arguments helped to garner
broad-based support for the Supreme Court’s speech-protective turn at a time when
liberals and labor groups were deeply suspicious of court-centered constitutionalism. Yet
to the extent they were credited at all, First Amendment right-to-work claims were
always a secondary component of the contemplated First Amendment bundle, which also
included a robust right to strike. In fact, the right to strike was the core issue around
which the interwar civil liberties movement coalesced.
Soon after extending constitutional protection to labor activity, the Supreme Court
reversed course, concerned that insulating labor relations from state regulation would
exacerbate industrial unrest and replicate the judicial overreaching it so recently had
repudiated. Over the ensuing decades, it backed away from strong First Amendment
protection in the labor law domain, a retreat that applied to pro- and anti-union activity in
equal measure. It denied constitutionally protected status to secondary boycotts, wildcat
1

136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam).
In June 2012, a petition for writ of certiorari was filed in Janus v. AFSCME, raising the same
questions presented in the Friedrichs case.
3
See, e.g., Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2014).
2
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strikes, and mass picketing even as it restricted the associational autonomy of individual
workers. But it always understood its anomalous analysis in First Amendment labor cases
as even-handed. When a challenge to public sector agency fees makes its way back to the
Supreme Court, the justices would do well to consider the consequences of unraveling a
constitutional compromise that has proven stable for more than half a century.
I. Labor Law and the First Amendment
In the spring of 2016, the eight members of the United States Supreme Court
deadlocked over the constitutionality of a central and longstanding feature of public
sector labor law. In Friedrichs, the Court was confronted with the question whether
public sector agency fee arrangements that compel non-members to contribute to a
union’s contract negotiation and administration expenses are consistent with the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution. That was a question the Court had long
since answered in the affirmative but that anti-union advocates, prior to Justice Antonin
Scalia’s death, hoped it might be persuaded to reconsider.4
Since the middle of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has interpreted
federal private sector labor law to permit union security agreements but to prohibit a
labor organization from requiring employees to become members or contribute
financially to its political or ideological activity.5 In its 1977 decision in Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education,6 the Court extended that rule to public sector employees. That is,
although Abood prevented states from compelling public employees to join a union or to
pay toward a union’s political expenses, the Court deemed it constitutionally permissible
to collect mandatory contributions toward a union’s “chargeable expenses,”7 including
the costs of collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment.8
States were therefore free to authorize the same modified agency shop arrangements that
were common in private sector workplaces governed by the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) and Railway Labor Act.9

4

For the history of the arguments in these cases and the advocates who advanced them, see SOPHIA Z. LEE,
THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT (2014); Joseph A. McCartin,
“A Wagner Act for Public Employees”: Labor’s Deferred Dream and the Rise of Conservatism, 1970–
1976, 95 J. AM. HIST. 123 (2008).
5
The early cases involved the Railway Labor Act. Ry. Emp.’s Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 721 (1956)
(holding that the union shop agreements permitted by the Railway Labor Act do not violate the First
Amendment); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 768–69 (1961) (construing the Railway
Labor Act to prohibit the use of non-members’ dues for political causes). Street was extended to the NLRA
in Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
6
431 U.S. 209 (1977).
7
In Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2284 (2012), the Supreme Court defined “chargeable
expenses” as “the cost of union services related to collective bargaining,” as distinct from the union’s
“political or ideological projects.” Abood, 431 U.S. at 232, included among chargeable expenses the costs
of “collective-bargaining, contract administration, and grievance-adjustment purposes.”
8
Abood, 431 U.S. at 232.
9
45 U.S.C. §§ 151–88 (2016).
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The Supreme Court revisited this issue in Harris v. Quinn,10 a 2014 challenge to a
public sector fair-share arrangement involving Illinois home health workers. A fivejustice majority ruled for the petitioners, who were assisted by the National Right to
Work Legal Defense Foundation, on the narrow factual grounds that they were not fullfledged state employees. Encouraged by dicta in Harris that was extremely critical of
Abood, the right-to-work movement pressed forward.11 In Friedrichs, the non-members
argued that there is no constitutionally relevant distinction between lobbying the
government and bargaining with the government, because the issues at stake in public
sector collective bargaining invariably implicate important public interests.12 In the
weeks before Justice Scalia’s death, many observers anticipated that a five-justice
majority would seize the opportunity to overrule its earlier decision and to impose a rightto-work regime on all public sector workers.13
The American labor law system is an unusual one, and it reflects a complicated
balancing by legislatures and the courts of individual and group rights, as well as broader
structural issues.14 The prevailing approach, which is modeled on the NLRA, allows
workers to determine as a group whether union representation will serve their interests.15
Once a union has attained the support of a majority of employees within a designated
bargaining unit, it represents all the workers within the unit on an exclusive basis.16 Many
state governments have opted to bargain with the unions that represent majorities of their
workers, just as federal law requires most private sector employers to do.17 In exchange,
employers—whether public or private sector—are usually shielded from contending with
demands by competing unions.18 They need not negotiate or enforce multiple contracts.
And they are protected from costly recognitional and secondary strikes.19
Of course, employees who object to union representation, whether they favor an
alternative union or oppose all unions, are not without recourse. If a majority of
10

134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
Id. at 2632.
12
Brief for Petitioners at 10–11, Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (No. 14-915), 2015 WL 5261564. The
petitioners argued in the alternative that unions should be permitted to collect contributions toward
chargeable expenses only from non-members who opted in to payments. Id. at 15.
13
See, e.g., Amy Howe, Union Fees in Jeopardy: In Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 11, 2016, 5:08
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/union-fees-in-jeopardy-in-plain-english [https://perma.cc/T8HXTH2A].
14
See generally Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 169, 221–24
(2015). Estlund’s insightful analysis focuses on the post Taft-Hartley period. This essay emphasizes that in
the labor context, ambivalence over the First Amendment, and especially its relationship to the right to
strike and the right to work, stretches back to the earliest days of the NLRA and is rooted in the
constitutional cases of the early twentieth century.
15
See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 221–22 (1977).
16
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), § 159(a) (2012) (“Representatives designated or selected for the purposes
of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be
the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining.”).
17
The duty to bargain does not, however, “compel either party to agree to a proposal.” Id. at § 158(d).
18
See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 65–70 (1975) (rejecting the
argument that national anti-discrimination policy requires an exception to the principle of exclusive
representation where employees “seek to bargain separately with their employer as to the elimination of
racially discriminatory employment practices”).
19
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 704(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (recognitional
picketing); 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (secondary activity).
11
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employees are dissatisfied with a union, they can vote to decertify it. If dissenting
employees are in the minority, they are free to express their disapproval of union policies,
to refuse to participate in strikes, and to withhold payment of fees that exceed what
Abood and its private sector analogs allowed.20 Moreover, a mix of state statutes and case
law impose on unions a “duty of fair representation,” which prohibits them from
retaliating against or otherwise disfavoring non-members.21 That is, any wage increases
or benefits the union negotiates on behalf of its members extend to non-members as
well—even when it would advantage members to trade the interests of non-members for
enhanced benefits for themselves—and unions are obligated to represent non-members
just as vigorously in grievance and arbitration procedures.
The result is the much-debated free rider problem, which Justice Scalia construed
a quarter-century ago as creating a “compelling state interest” sufficient to justify a state
in “permit[ting] the union to demand reimbursement.”22 In the absence of a duty of fair
representation, employees who desired to share in union-negotiated benefits would have
no choice but to join the union. By contrast, employees have little direct incentive to
contribute financially to a union that is legally required to represent them just as
zealously as members. The fewer the number of dues-paying members, the less effective
the union becomes, which in turn renders the remaining members less eager to pay dues.
Fair-share agency fees long ago emerged as the most tenable solution.
Opponents of Abood point to other areas of First Amendment law in which the
Supreme Court has recognized compelled payments and subsidies as unconstitutional.
Some of those cases postdate Abood, raising the possibility that public sector fair share
fees are no longer consistent with First Amendment doctrine.23 There are plausible
arguments to be made on both sides of this debate. And yet, as a matter of First
Amendment doctrine, as well as sound public policy, the status of fair share fees cannot
be divorced from the broader labor law regime in which they are situated. Abood reflects
a careful balance between the associational rights of unions and their members, on the
one hand, and the rights of non-members to opt out on the other.24 More starkly, to the

20

See, e.g., Pattern Makers’ League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 115–16 (1985) (upholding NLRB’s
construction of the NLRA to prohibit a union from fining employees who had tendered their resignation
during a strike).
21
The duty of fair representation originated in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 323 U.S. 192,
202–03 (1944).
22
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 556 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part); see also Commc’ns Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 753 (1988); Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 224–26 (1977); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 767 (1961).
23
See, e.g., United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 415 (2001) (refusing to uphold “compelled
subsidies for speech in the context of a program where the principal object is speech itself”); Knox v.
SEIU, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2295 (2012) (noting that past holdings permitting closed shop
agreements and opt-out billing schemes “have substantially impinged on the First Amendment rights of
nonmembers” and rejecting “any further impingement”).
24
Catherine Fisk and Margaux Poueymirou have persuasively argued that compelled representation of nonmembers in the absence of agency fees, which is necessarily funded by the payments of members who
would prefer not to subsidize non-members, is a First Amendment violation to precisely the same extent as
compelled payment of dues by non-members who would prefer not to subsidize the union and its members.
That is, either both or neither are unconstitutional. Catherine L. Fisk & Margaux Poueymirou, Harris v.
Quinn and the Contradictions of Compelled Speech, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 439 (2015); see also Catherine
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extent that fair-share fees trench on otherwise insulated First Amendment terrain, they are
hardly the worst offenders within the labor law domain. After all, state legislation as well
as federal labor law expressly curtail core First Amendment activity that is virtually
immune from regulation in other domains, including the ability of workers to picket,
boycott, and strike.
In short, from a historical perspective, the question whether compelled
contributions toward chargeable expenses by public sector employees is closer to
mushroom-growing subsidies25 or integrated bar dues26 is somewhat beside the point. The
crucial question is why the Supreme Court has proven so reluctant to extend even
paradigmatic First Amendment protections to labor unions, employers, and dissenting
employees. Understanding today’s speech-restrictive labor law regime requires exhuming
a historical world that has slipped from view.
A constitutional prohibition on fair-share agency fees would alter a single
component of a complicated labor law system without regard to related provisions. In our
period of low union density and relative labor quiescence—in which some combination
of legal, social, and economic impediments has rendered even simple work stoppages
virtually nonexistent27—judges and advocates have forgotten a phenomenon that the
Abood Court grasped well. In the context of labor law, the First Amendment is a
precarious thread, and pulling on it threatens to unravel the whole structure of American
labor relations.

II. Organized Labor in the Lochner Era
That the subsidence of American labor unrest has coincided with a new judicial
openness to economically inflected First Amendment claims is presumably no accident.
The Friedrichs case and its inevitable successors are part of a mounting effort to
challenge social and economic regulation through the guise of the First Amendment. The
past decades have witnessed a marked shift in First Amendment law from the protection
of disfavored minorities against state suppression to the insulation of industrial interests
against government regulation.28 That effort has overlapped almost perfectly with the
Fisk & Benjamin Sachs, Restoring Equity in Right to Work Laws, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 857, 862–68
(2014).
25
United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
26
Like Abood, cases on integrated bar dues have precluded use of compulsory fees for political purposes.
See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Kingstad v. State Bar, 622 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2010).
27
In 2015, the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics recorded twelve major strikes and
lockouts involving a total of 47,000 workers. During the mid-twentieth century, annual totals sometimes
approached five hundred major strikes and over two million workers. Economic News Release, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, DEPT. OF LABOR, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/wkstp.t01.htm
[https://perma.cc/G6HC-R8MM] (last modified Feb. 9, 2017).
28
See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History, Data, and
Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENTARY 223 (2015). For early analysis of this transformation, see MARK A.
GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH (1991); OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
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decline in labor’s power, whose symbolic harbinger—President Ronald Reagan’s hiring
of permanent replacements in the 1981 air traffic controller strike—came just months
after the Supreme Court issued a watershed decision on promotional advertising that
signaled its increasing discomfort with the regulation of commercial speech.29 Today, as
labor struggles to redefine its role and relevance and to imagine a legal regime more
conducive to its political and economic goals,30 empirical evidence suggests that almost
half of First Amendment victories benefit business corporations and trade groups
challenging unwelcome regulatory interventions.31
This transformation has aptly been labeled the Lochnerization of the First
Amendment,32 on the theory that businesses are using the First Amendment to do the
work that substantive due process once performed in the era of Lochner v. New York,33
the notorious 1905 Supreme Court case invalidating a New York maximum-hours law for
bakers as an infringement of liberty of contract.34 That is, like liberty of contract in the
early twentieth century, the First Amendment is being used today to dismantle
burdensome regulatory regimes.
The literature characterizes this transformation as a new direction in First
Amendment law, but from the standpoint of the interwar coalition that litigated the
foundational First Amendment cases, it might better be classified as a course correction.
As I have argued elsewhere, the Lochnerization of the First Amendment began many
decades ago. In fact, it began almost the instant that Lochner itself was put to rest.
Lochner’s anti-regulatory constitutionalism was embedded in the First Amendment at the
moment that the so called New Deal settlement was struck. And it was integrally related
to Progressive Era labor conflict.35

AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER
FREE SPEECH (Free Press 1993).

(1996); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF

29

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The Supreme Court had
already narrowed the permissible regulation of informational advertising in Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va.
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). On the significance of the PATCO strike, see JOSEPH A.
MCCARTIN, COLLISION COURSE: RONALD REAGAN, THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS, AND THE STRIKE
THAT CHANGED AMERICA (2011).
30 See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L. J. 1 (2016).
31
See Coates, supra note 28, at 250–52.
32
See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment,
1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 384; Morton Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality
Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 109–16 (1993) (discussing “The Lochnerization of the
First Amendment”); Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 Harv. L. Rev. F.
165 (2015); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 Wis. L. Rev. 133. Recent scholarship has examined
the significance of the deregulatory First Amendment in the labor context. See, e.g., Charlotte Garden, The
Deregulatory First Amendment at Work, 51 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323 (2016); Helen Norton, Truth and
Lies in the Workplace: Employer Speech and the First Amendment, 100 Minn. L. Rev. 31 (2016); Cynthia
Estlund, Truth, Lies, and Power at Work, 101 Minn. L. Rev. 349 (2017).
33
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
34
Id. at 64.
35
See generally LAURA WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH: AMERICA’S CIVIL LIBERTIES COMPROMISE
(2016) [hereinafter WEINRIB, TAMING]; Laura Weinrib, Civil Liberties Outside the Courts, 2014 SUP. CT.
REV. 297; Laura Weinrib, The Liberal Compromise: Civil Liberties, Labor, and the Limits of State Power,
1917–1940 (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University).
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Today, Lochner-era jurisprudence is most closely identified with the cases whose
facts resemble Lochner’s: cases, that is, in which state and federal courts invalidated
legislative efforts to improve workplace safety or dictate the terms of employment. For
the early labor movement, however, such decisions represented only one component of a
broader judicial hostility to workers’ rights. For example, the Supreme Court’s 1897
decision in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,36 which first read liberty of contract into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, hamstrung unions as much as or more than
progressive legislatures.
During the early decades of the twentieth century, the federal judiciary cabined
legislative power to authorize union activity while expanding its own authority to curtail
strikes and boycotts.37 In 1908, the Supreme Court struck down a federal prohibition on
anti-union discrimination in the railroad industry for abridging workers’ freedom of
contract under the Fifth Amendment.38 In 1915, it extended that holding to the states.39
Relying on “constitutional freedom of contract” under the Fourteenth Amendment,40 it
invalidated a state law that made it unlawful for an employer to require an employee to
enter into an agreement “not to join or become or remain a member of any labor
organization or association, as a condition of such person or persons securing
employment.”41 Rejecting the state’s asserted effort to limit employer “coercion” and to
ensure the liberty of workers to join organizations of their choosing, the Court construed
the targeted yellow-dog contracts as advancing the right of an employee “to work for
whom he will.”42 Two years later, it upheld a controversial injunction against the United
Mine Workers that encompassed efforts to persuade workers to join the union, because
the prospective recruits had exercised their “constitutional rights of personal liberty and
private property” by signing yellow-dog contracts.43 And in 1921, the newly appointed
chief justice William Howard Taft issued an opinion in Truax v. Corrigan,44 which was
castigated by labor for its apparent partiality to employers. Invalidating a state statute that
limited the authority of judges to issue injunctions in labor disputes, the majority
denounced labor picketing as “moral coercion by illegal annoyance and obstruction” and
concluded that “a law which operates to make lawful such a wrong . . . deprives the
owner of the business and the premises of his property without due process.”45
Even as the Supreme Court invalidated anti-yellow dog laws for abridging liberty
of contract, it denied constitutional protection to labor tactics, including the boycott and
the strike. In Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co.,46 the Court rejected out of hand the
36

165 U.S. 578 (1897).
See generally DANIEL R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO CORPORATE
LIBERALISM (1995); WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT
(1991); CHRIS TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED
LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960 (1985).
38
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172 (1908).
39
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 13 (1915).
40
Id.
41
Id. at 6.
42
Id. at 23.
43
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 251 (1917).
44
257 U.S. 312 (1921).
45
Id. at 328.
46
221 U.S. 418 (1911).
37

7

notion that the American Federation of Labor’s (AFL’s) “We Don’t Patronize List,”
which cataloged employers that the AFL considered “unfair,” was protected First
Amendment expression.47 As a spokesperson for the National Association of
Manufacturers (NAM) explained, it was every bit as legitimate “to enjoin the use of [a
man’s] hands or his feet or his head to do some unlawful thing” as it was “to use the
injunction in connection with the use of the tongue.”48
The same reasoning undergirded the Taft Court’s decisions during the 1920s. In
1926, three years after invalidating a state compulsory arbitration statute for unduly
burdening businesses,49 the Court upheld the criminal conviction of a union officer under
the same law for engaging in a strike.50 The majority opinion decisively rejected labor’s
attempt to ground the right to strike in either the common law or the Constitution.51
Indeed, according to the courts, laws prohibiting strikes and boycotts served rather than
impeded personal liberty. “The labor unions and [their] officers,” reflected a lower court
in Buck’s Stove, “meddle into a member’s daily affairs deeper than does the law; restrict
him in matters that the law leaves free.”52
In the face of such decisions, labor leaders and their allies charged the courts with
hypocrisy.53 Increasingly, they accused the judiciary of erecting a labor law regime best
characterized as “Heads, I win; Tails, you lose.”54 During the 1910s, progressives
launched a frontal assault on the courts, along with common law legalism and
constitutionalism.55 Establishment lawyers and politicians introduced various proposals
to curb judicial overreaching, and many states enacted provisions for the democratic
recall of judges. Concerns about the courts were sufficiently pervasive that former
president Theodore Roosevelt, campaigning for a return to the White House on the
Progressive Party ticket, promoted the “recall of judicial decisions” and pronounced it
“absolutely necessary for the people themselves to take control of the interpretation of the
constitution.”56 Even some conservatives fretted that the judiciary’s fiercely antilabor

47

Id. at 439.
See U.S. COMM’N ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT AND TESTIMONY SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS
BY THE COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, S. DOC. NO. 64-415, at 10,823 (Statement of James A.
Emery, May 18, 1915).
49
See Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 544 (1923).
50
See Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926).
51
Id.
52
Transcript of Record at 627, Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911) (No. 372).
53
See WEINRIB, TAMING, supra note 35, at ch. 1.
54
U.S. COMM’N ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 48, at 10,895 (1st Sess. 1916)
(Additional Statement of Theodore Schroeder, May 27, 1915).
55
See DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (2006); MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY
(1992); MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (1949);
WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN
AMERICA, 1886–1937 187–97 (1998); MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN
PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO (2003).
56
Progressive Party Platform, 1924, in GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO
THE PRESENT DAY, 1864–1981, vol. 3, 326 (Richard Hofstadter & Beatrice K. Hofstadter eds., rev. ed.
1982); Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Herbert David Croly, in Theodore Roosevelt Papers,
Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress (Feb. 29, 1912),
48
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jurisprudence was straining popular confidence in the courts and “endanger[ing]
imbedded political and constitutional traditions of due process,” along with the American
commitment to rule of law.57
The campaign to curtail judicial power flagged during the 1920s, when a
combination of economic prosperity and state-sanctioned antilabor offensives dampened
union influence. In 1924, the plank of the Progressive Party platform urging abolition of
“the tyranny and usurpation of the courts, including the practice of nullifying legislation
in conflict with the political, social or economic theories of the judges,” found few
supporters outside labor circles.58 But within a decade, judicial inflexibility in the face of
the Great Depression made demands for reform more urgent than ever. Notably, a
reinvigorated labor movement was instrumental in reviving the attack on Lochner-era
constitutionalism.59 After all, in the face of rising labor militancy, a decisive
congressional majority passed the NLRA in 1935.60 As violent strikes roiled the nation,
the statute aimed to improve economic conditions and reduce labor unrest by legitimating
union activity.61 Yet business groups actively advised their members to disregard their
obligations to bargain with unions under the NLRA, on the theory that the Supreme Court
was certain to consider it an unconstitutional incursion on the property rights of
employers and an unconstitutional interference with the liberty of antiunion employees.62
By the mid-1930s, of course, the very future of judicial review was in jeopardy.
President Franklin Roosevelt’s much maligned Court-packing plan met political
resistance for its disingenuous reliance on strained judicial resources and its perceived
aggrandizement of executive, in place of judicial, power.63 Other proposals, however, had
ample support. And many of them, including calls to abolish judicial review by
constitutional amendment, promised far greater inroads on judicial authority. In
congressional hearings on the Court-packing plan and in impassioned public debate over
the future of the courts, the judiciary’s mistreatment of organized labor played an outsize
role. To unions, victory in their decades-long battle against Lochner-era constitutionalism
at last appeared within reach.

http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/Research/Digital-Library/Record/?libID=o224709
[https://perma.cc/SC4S-QJRB].
57
Charles O. Gregory, Peaceful Picketing and Freedom of Speech, 26 ABA J. 709, 710 (1940).
58
See, e.g., La Follette Has No Answer to Charges Made by Dawes, ST. PETERSBURG, FLORIDA,
INDEPENDENT, Sept. 12, 1924; A Platform of Business Principles, NATION’S BUSINESS, Dec. 1924, at 37.
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III. From the Right to Strike to the Right to Work
Ever since the Supreme Court handed them down, its 1937 decisions in West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish64 and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.65 have been
described as the opening shots of a revolution in constitutional law.66 As future Supreme
Court justice Robert H. Jackson observed, the “avalanche of victories” that unfolded that
spring—which constituted “a legal revolution, as real and meaningful as any ever fought
on a field of battle”—“were the greatest days in labor’s legal history.”67 In accepting the
constitutionality of minimum wage laws and subsequently of federal labor law, the
Supreme Court definitively abandoned its reliance on constitutional liberty and property
rights (along with the Commerce Clause) and signaled a new deference to government
regulation of the economy.
The esteemed constitutional scholar Edward S. Corwin was among the first
commentators to characterize the 1937 decisions as revolutionary, a label he grounded in
the Supreme Court’s abandonment of its laissez-faire conception of “liberty.”68 That is,
what made the decisions “so radical” and “so altogether dramatic” was their
reconceptualization of liberty “as something that may be infringed by other forces as well
as by those of government; indeed, something that may require the positive intervention
of government against those other forces.”69 To be sure, the Court did not identify this
new form of liberty as an independent constitutional right. Even after 1937, neither
theorists nor advocates ordinarily argued that state assistance for organized labor was
constitutionally compelled. Still, Corwin’s insight would prove crucial in interpreting the
NLRA and in deflecting subsequent constitutional attacks on the statutory framework.
Looking forward, however, the late 1930s constitutional moment was even more
revolutionary than Corwin anticipated. Indeed, what was most revolutionary about the
emerging constitutional doctrine was how completely it reversed course. The New Deal
Supreme Court did not stop at stripping employers of their Lochner-era liberty and
property rights. Even as it wrote employers’ antiunion appeals to freedom of contract out
of the Constitution, it wrote First Amendment protection for labor’s most powerful tactics
in.
64

300 U.S. 379 (1937).
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
66
On the constitutional revolution, see BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE
STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME
COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995); RICHARD A.
MAIDMENT, THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE NEW DEAL: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND
ECONOMIC REGULATION, 1934–1936 (1991); AHR Forum: The Debate over the Constitutional Revolution
of 1937, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1046 (2005).
67
Robert H. Jackson, “Labor’s New Rights and Responsibilities,” Aug. 24, 1934, Records of the Special
Executive Assistant to the Attorney General, 1933–1940, Subject Files, 1933–1940, General Records
of the Department of Justice, Record Group 60, National Archives and Record Administration, box 6,
folder Jackson.
68
Edward S. Corwin, The Court Sees a New Light, NEW REPUBLIC 354 (Aug. 4, 1937).
69
Id.
65

10

In its famous fourth footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,70 the
Supreme Court flagged an exception to its new, hands-off approach to constitutional
interpretation: it would continue to subject laws to exacting judicial scrutiny where they
burdened the rights of minorities or infringed freedom of speech.71 Although it is
typically regarded as a subsequent development, the move to reclassify traditionally
economic transactions as expressive ones was part and parcel of the new constitutional
regime. In fact, the lawyers and litigants who championed free speech in the years before
Carolene Products were concerned above all with protecting labor’s rights.72 The
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which unabashedly described itself as a
partisan of labor in its founding documents,73 promoted what it called a “right of
agitation”: a right of workers to picket, boycott, and strike.74 Despite deep ambivalence
and even antipathy to constitutional rights based claims among the organization’s early
leadership,75 much of the ACLU’s interwar litigation strategy was meant to make its
prolabor agenda palatable to the courts. Over the objections of labor movement allies
who regarded the judiciary as an inevitable abettor of industrial interests, the ACLU
stubbornly invited the courts to expand First Amendment protection of labor picketing.
Although it often emphasized more anodyne pursuits—including its campaigns for
academic and artistic freedom—its overarching objective was to render workers’
concerted activity a constitutional right.76 And particularly after the Supreme Court’s
Spring 1937 decisions blunted substantive due process as an antilabor tool, the First
Amendment strategy found friendly reception among labor leaders and their New Deal
supporters.
It is a largely forgotten feature of constitutional history that this labor vision of the
First Amendment briefly prevailed. Today, the notion of a right to strike, picket, and
boycott independent of any regulatory regime seems fanciful. But amid the industrial
unrest of the 1930s, a wide range of civil liberties advocates within and outside
government believed that protecting workers’ collective rights would stave off the more
extreme violence associated with labor struggles abroad.77 Moreover, few issues seemed
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more central than labor to the democratic concerns of the First Amendment.78 In Jones &
Laughlin Steel, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes called the right of workers to
organize a “fundamental right.”79 The following month, Justice Louis Brandeis issued an
opinion in Senn v. Tile Layers Protection Union.80 In upholding a Wisconsin statute that
authorized labor picketing, Brandeis explained that union members were entitled to
publicize the facts of a labor dispute because “freedom of speech is guaranteed by the
federal Constitution.”81 And the first case to invoke the speech-protective theory of
footnote four of Carolene Products was a 1940 labor case, Thornhill v. Alabama,82 in
which Justice Frank Murphy upheld the right to picket as an expression of ideas.83 “Free
discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes appears
to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular
government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society,” Murphy reasoned.84
Thornhill’s companion case, Carlson v. California,85 added that the “liberty of
communication” protected by the First Amendment also included the peaceful
dissemination of “the facts of a labor dispute . . . by pamphlet, by word of mouth or by
banner.”86 Although these cases are relegated to footnotes in most contemporary
constitutional law casebooks, they were considered monumental in their time. Lee
Pressman, the erstwhile anti-judiciary general counsel of the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO) who argued Carlson in the Supreme Court, expressed increasing
confidence in the argument that “labor action is nothing more or less than the exercise of
constitutional rights.”87 In 1941, Herbert Wechsler adjudged the Supreme Court’s
decision incorporating the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to be far less
important than the labor picketing cases, to which he attributed “major significance.”88
In many respects, the First Amendment strategy for advancing labor’s rights was
a risky one. As labor and industry both understood, there were deep affinities between the
effort to secure constitutional protection for workers’ concerted activity and business
leaders’ appeal to liberty of contract.89 In fact, the ACLU secured conservative support
for free speech on precisely that basis, and the unlikely coalition that resulted was
instrumental in persuading the courts to expand the scope of protected First Amendment
activity. For example, in the run-up to the Court-packing plan, the American Bar
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Association concluded that the best way to preserve judicial review from democratic
curtailment was to persuade the public of the importance of the handful of civil liberties
victories that the ACLU had litigated and the ABA had long opposed.90 The ABA’s civil
liberties campaign did not forestall the Supreme Court’s spring 1937 decisions, which the
organization’s next president decried as “the most devastating destruction of
constitutional limitations upon Federal power.”91 Still, the civil liberties campaign helped
to improve the bar’s negative reputation. And the positive publicity—coupled with the
swift realization that after the demise of Lochner-era liberty, civil liberties protections
might provide an alternative basis for constitutional argumentation when “the rights
denied or the privacy invaded were those of the business corporation”—led the ABA to
create a new Committee on the Bill of Rights in 1938.92 Among that committee’s first
tasks was to submit an amicus brief in a foundational First Amendment labor case, Hague
v. Committee for Industrial Organization.93 The brief proved to be a public relations
triumph, and the ABA believed that it exerted considerable influence on the Court.94
The new fondness for free speech quickly extended from conservative lawyers to
their corporate clients. Although media advocates had long defended their business
practices as extensions of the freedom of the press, other pre-New Deal industrialists
were content to rest on their property rights, and they typically impugned free speech
claims for their subversive potential. But the Great Depression eroded the old allure of
private property as the anchor of American freedom, and so, increasingly, businesses
began to denounce government regulatory efforts as infringements of First Amendment
freedoms instead. By the end of the 1930s, the pamphlets and public addresses of the
National Association of Manufacturers and Chamber of Commerce of the United States
were rife with references to the First Amendment. After all, Justice Brandeis’s decision in
Senn had compared labor picketing to advertising, implicitly “invest[ing] both types of
publicity pressures with the dignity of freedom of speech.”95
The shift was swift and sweeping. In 1938, the NAM defended its anti-New Deal
lobbying as an exercise of free expression.96 Just months after Thornhill was decided, the
Chamber of Commerce highlighted the potential benefits of constitutional protection for
commercial speech.97 Above all, conservatives hoped that the First Amendment might
90
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chip away at Congress’ newly validated protections for organized labor. At the end of the
decade, corporate lawyers and business groups denounced the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) for preventing the Ford Motor Company from distributing antiunion
literature to its employees.98 What the agency characterized as an exercise of coercive
interference with the right to organize, Ford’s lawyers and supporters deemed an
unlawful incursion on free expression. And the ACLU, concerned that any abrogation of
free expression on the basis of economic coercion would undermine First Amendment
protection for the right to strike, joined business groups in chastising the NLRB for its
abridgment of free speech.
It was a short road from a First Amendment defense of the right to oppose union
activity to a First Amendment defense of the right to work.99 Although employers had
long argued that union security agreements (as well as strikes and boycotts) abridged the
liberty interests of nonmembers—and federal courts proved willing to rely on the
common law and antitrust protections to enjoin efforts to secure such concessions—the
voluntary nature of bargaining agreements between unions and employers in the pre-New
Deal era weakened their link to federal constitutional law. According to antilabor
advocates, the NLRA supplied the requisite state action; and, in lieu of liberty of contract,
the First Amendment emerged as the most plausible hook for a constitutional claim. By
June 1941, Samuel Pettengill counseled his audience at the annual meeting of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce to uphold the “rights of the individual and of the minority” even
as he decried the closed shop and declared the right of strikebreakers to cross the picket
line.100 According to Pettengill, the “equal right to work” was “the first right of all.”101
Such arguments were not lost on the critics of Lochner-era constitutionalism who
had so recently enlisted the Supreme Court to their point of view. Charles O. Gregory, a
University of Chicago law professor and prominent labor scholar, captured widespread
concerns when he criticized the Thornhill decision in the ABA Journal.102 According to
Gregory, common law restraints on nonviolent union activity had no place in the post
New Deal legal order. By the same token, state legislatures might sensibly protect union
activity from employer interference; the Supreme Court’s constitutional analysis in Truax
v. Corrigan “still baffle[d] good lawyers.”103 On the other hand, it was no more
legitimate to shield labor picketing from state regulation on First Amendment grounds
than it was to insulate employers against state regulation on the basis of liberty of
contract. “True liberals in this country no longer look askance at economic compulsion,”
Gregory argued, but to “call such coercion constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
speech” was a “perversion of an American ideal.”104 He reflected:
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For years the “Old Court” was under fire because of its doctrine of “substantive
due process” developed to make possible the invalidation of local legislative
experiments. It now seems from the picketing cases of last Spring that the “New
Court” is perpetuating this error by using the Fourteenth Amendment to establish
its conception of the guaranties of liberty set forth in the First Amendment.105
To Gregory, Thornhill and Carlson—like the Lochner-era cases before them—were
dangerous usurpations of government authority to regulate labor relations. Gregory, in
short, was lamenting the Lochnerization of the First Amendment.
IV. Labor’s Constitutional Compromise
It is a deep irony of the interwar civil liberties movement that its overarching
purpose was to inscribe into law a First Amendment right to picket, boycott, and strike,
and yet those rights were written out of the First Amendment almost as soon as Carolene
Products was decided. Presumably the justices of the Supreme Court were weighing
assessments like Charles Gregory’s when they sharply limited constitutional protection
for labor activity just one year after introducing it. In 1941, the Court issued a decision in
Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,106 upholding a state court’s
injunction against picketing by a union that had previously engaged in property
destruction and violence. Writing for the majority, Justice Felix Frankfurter concluded
that “utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and
become part of an instrument of force,” and that subsequent picketing, even if peaceful,
could constitutionally be enjoined.107 Frankfurter had championed the Norris-LaGuardia
Act,108 the landmark federal legislation that limited the federal courts’ injunctive power
in labor disputes, and subsequent commentators have strained to explain his apparent
about face.109 To many of his contemporaries, however, Frankfurter’s reasoning was
apparent. Not only would expanding constitutional protection for union speech trench on
legislative prerogatives; it would also open the door to First Amendment claims by
employers. As Charles Gregory mused, it was “disquieting to hear proponents of
organized labor applaud [Thornhill and Carlson] and then condemn a manufacturer who,
contrary to the terms of the Wagner Act, insists upon telling his employees exactly what
he thinks of a certain labor union and why.”110 Some groups, including the ACLU,
thought the solution was to safeguard the First Amendment rights of unions and
employers alike. Many New Dealers, including many judges, preferred to withhold
constitutional protection from both.
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As the 1940s unfolded, it was the latter approach that prevailed. When strikes or
pickets were most effective, and therefore most coercive, they lost their status as
constitutionally protected expression.111 No doubt judges and justices were motivated by
a range of competing concerns. Some were driven by an abiding commitment to judicial
restraint, lest Lochnerism rear its head. Reflecting backwards, they worried that the
invigoration of the First Amendment would lead to judicial usurpation of the police
power in the service of industry. Others interpreted the massive strike wave at the end of
the Second World War as evidence that the labor law pendulum had swung too far
toward organized labor. Before the New Deal, courts had suppressed strikes and boycotts
while extending constitutional protection to yellow-dog contracts and extolling the
virtues of the open shop. A decade later, strikes were constitutionally protected and union
security agreements were not. As union membership skyrocketed and workers voiced the
demands they had tabled during the war, many Americans blamed the New Deal labor
law regime for excessively inflating union power; some judges presumably agreed. Still
others remained personally partial to organized labor but believed that the legitimacy and
survival of constitutional liberalism required the Court to avoid the appearance of bias in
its application of countermajoritian principles. Conservative efforts to embed the right to
work in the First Amendment did not directly succeed in the 1940s, at least in the courts,
but they may have achieved a more attenuated victory in checking the labor vision of
civil liberties. No doubt the specter of a First Amendment right to work affected the
litigants, advocates, and judges who engaged with the First Amendment right to strike.
The First Amendment labor cases of the 1940s and 1950s crystalized into a
compact that lasted, with some modifications at the margins, for more than fifty years.
Over the course of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court unceremoniously denied
constitutional protection to the very modes of expression that it pronounced core to First
Amendment ideals in other domains. A long list of labor law’s First Amendment
anomalies is easy to assemble. The same collective bargaining agreements that require
non-members to contribute agency fees also require both members and non-members to
forgo much more recognizably First Amendment expression, including strikes, while the
contract is in effect. Yet the Court has long since deemed no-strike clauses enforceable
by injunction, notwithstanding the language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.112 Meanwhile,
the NLRA directly limits recognitional picketing and secondary activity, along with
wildcat strikes.113 And of course, many states simply prohibit strikes by public sector
111
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workers, in terms that far outstrip the usual latitude afforded states in regulating
government employees. In the ordinary political context, of course, picketing is
quintessential First Amendment activity, and declining to protect it would be virtually
unfathomable.114 Labor picketing, labor boycotts, and union associational activity are all
routinely curbed by the state.115

V. Conclusion: Some Lessons from Lochner
As the Roberts Court has forged ahead with the Lochnerization of the First
Amendment, it has begun to expand constitutional protections for employees who object
to the payment of union dues. It has curtailed the ability of public sector unions to collect
payments toward ideological activity by adjusting the default rules of non-member
contributions,116 and it has reduced the class of state-funded workers covered by
Abood.117 Thus far, it has declined to extend reciprocal protection to labor’s expressive
activity. It has rejected unions’ freedom of association claims,118 and it has accepted
statutory restrictions on secondary activity and the right to strike. This outcome would
have been a tremendous surprise to interwar advocates and judges. By the end of the New
Deal, all the signs pointed the other way. Unions enjoyed burgeoning First Amendment
rights, whereas the objections of non-members were of minimal constitutional concern.
There were comparatively few advocates for a union’s duty of fair representation to
bargaining unit employees, whether statutory or constitutional, and, within the New Deal
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administration at least, the closed shop was widely accepted as a legitimate outcome of
workplace democracy.119
If the Supreme Court ultimately recognizes a First Amendment right to work, a
cascade of cases will follow. As an initial matter, the dues-paying members in that new
regime may plausibly object that the government is forcing them to subsidize nonmembers in violation of their First Amendment rights.120 But the slippery slope is steeper
than that. Union members may also feel that an injunction to enforce a no-strike clause is
incompatible with the First Amendment. They may argue that they are entitled to express
their solidarity with other struggling workers—that picketing over disputes at distant
workplaces is protected by the Constitution, even when unions are involved.121 For their
part, the right-to-work forces are almost certain to transpose their argument onto private
sector labor law, which the Supreme Court (sidestepping a significant state action
question with respect to constitutional claims122) has proven inclined to align with its
public sector decisions as a matter of statutory interpretation.
One might imagine that the Court’s one-sided First Amendment expansion will
prove difficult to contain. In fact, lower courts have already begun to narrow the class of
secondary activity subject to regulation. And to the extent the justices hold the line, they
will open themselves to the same charges of hypocrisy and antilabor bias that beset their
Lochner-era forebears. Moving forward, lawyers, litigants, and judges will have to decide
whether robust First Amendment review of labor law would ultimately serve their
interests, and at what cost.123
During the decades after the Constitutional Revolution, the Supreme Court
insisted that the First Amendment must occasionally yield to legislative choices about
“the competing interests of unions, employers, their employees, and the public at
large.”124 In upholding a state injunction against peaceful picketing in the 1957 decision
Teamsters Union v. Vogt,125 Justice Frankfurter explained on behalf of the Supreme Court
majority that constitutional protection for free speech did not immunize labor activity
from state regulation.126 In a mournful dissent, Justice Douglas described the decision as
a “formal surrender.”127 “[F]or practical purposes,” he explained, the law had reverted to
the “situation . . . as it was when Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union was decided.”
Organized labor was protected by statute rather than the Constitution, as it was in the
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brief period been between the Supreme Court’s validation of the NLRA in Jones &
Laughlin Steel and its subsequent decisions elevating union activity to First Amendment
status. That is, labor picketing was subject to government regulation, as it was before the
modern First Amendment took shape.128
But in accusing the Court of “com[ing] full circle,”129 Justice Douglas
exaggerated the extent of the Court’s retreat. The picketing decisions of the midtwentieth century reflected a durable compromise, pursuant to which labor and antiunion
speech were equivalently inured to First Amendment challenge. Lurking behind labor’s
First Amendment exceptionalism was the recognition that the postwar labor law regime,
with its complicated balancing of employer and worker rights, had operated to dampen
industrial unrest and facilitate American economic growth.130 To advance these goals—
which may have seemed like “compelling government interests,” though the
accommodation was rarely framed in conventional doctrinal terms—the courts
constrained the operation of the First Amendment in the labor context. Just as an
unequivocal right to strike would unleash unpalatable economic power, an unequivocal
right to work would disturb the New Deal settlement and impugn the legitimacy of the
courts, not to mention the stability of the postwar legal order.
Against this broader backdrop, recognizing a First Amendment obstacle to public
sector agency fees threatens to unweave the web. To couch the right to work in the
Constitution while licensing courts and legislatures to suppress the right to strike would
truly be to “come full circle.” It would replicate the constitutional dynamics of the
Lochner-era, an approach excoriated by generations of scholars and judges for its
lopsided attentiveness to the interests of antiunion workers and employers.131 It would, in
short, mark a return “for practical purposes” to the “situation . . . as it was” before Jones
& Laughlin Steel was decided. And the situation then, it bears remembering, was a world
on the brink of revolution.
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131 See generally DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST
PROGRESSIVE REFORM 1-7, 108-24 (2011) (characterizing Lochner as “the most disreputable case in
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